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THE DEAD HAND: THE LAST GRASP?
STEPHEN

D.

BOME*

INTRODUCTION

On May 12, 1975, the United States Supreme Court abstained from hearing
a case in which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania declared unconstitutional
a local statute restricting testamentary gifts to charitable institutions. Prior
to the Pennsylvania decision, another successful challenge to the constitutionality of a similar statute was maintained in the District of Columbia. Such
decisions cast doubt on the continued viability of statutes that place some
restrictions on testamentary charitable gifts. These statutory restrictions,
probably derived from the English Mortmain Acts, survive in eleven American
jurisdictions. This article will trace the historical basis for such laws, discuss
the form in which they currently exist, and note the constitutional impediments that have been raised in connection with them.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Early during his reign in England, William the Conqueror is reputed to
have puzzled over the efficiency of his victory. He is said to have inquired
as to how, in but one battle, he had conquered a land that so many before
him could not take. As the story goes, he was told that his success was largely
attributable to the extensive holdings of the Church,: which severely de-

pleted the resources available to the defending lords.
Land held in Frankalmoigne (Church) tenure was not subject to many
incidents of the feudal system.2 Thus, when an army had to be raised, a
lord generally could not look to his religious tenants for physical support.
*B.S. in B.A., 1968, Boston University; J.D. 1971, University of California Hastings
College of Law; LL.M. 1975, New York University. The author wishes to express his
appreciation to Elizabeth D. Bauman, a member of the second year class and the Law
Review staff at New York University School of Law, who served as his research assistant
during the period when this article was prepared, and who aided immeasurably in its
production.
1. "William the Conqueror, demanded the cause of why he himself conquered the
realm by one battle, which the Danes could not effect by many. Frederick, the Abbot of
St. Alban's answered, that the reason was, because now the land, which was the
maintenance of martial men, was converted and given to pious employments, and for the
maintenance of holy votaries: -To which the Conqueror replied, that if the clergy be
so strong, that the realm is enfeebled of men for the war, and subject thereby to foreign
invasion, he would aid it: and therefore took away many of the revenues of this abbot,
and of others also. - I take this to be the origin of all the restraints in Mortmain."
A. HIGHMO-, THE HIsToRY Or MoRTMAIN 1 (1737) [hereinafter cited as A. HIGHMORE].
See also Lathrop v. Commercial Bank, 38 Ky. 114 (1839).
2. For an excellent general discussion of the tenurial system in feudal England, see
H. BIGELOW, INTRODUCTION TO THE IAW OF REAL PROPERTY 1-11 (3d ed. 1945).
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Similarly, much of the fund-raising capacity of the land was lost because
the Church never attained majority, married, or died. 3 The problems of
overlords inherent in having tenants holding in Frankalmoigne Tenure were
by no means ephemeral. Since the Church had perpetual life, it became a
tenant forever.4 Giving to religious houses became a common means of
easing the giver's conscience and protecting his soul.5 Thus, as monastic
orders constantly acquired lands and seldom conveyed their holdings, the
fear was expressed that they would eventually control all the land in England.,
In fact, it has been suggested that by 1290 they controlled between one-third
and one-half of the land in that country.
The first Magna Carta reflected the growing concern over Church acquisitions8 and was given effect by the Provisions of Westminster in 1258.9 Gifts
of land to religious houses were proscribed when such gifts were made with
intent to avoid duties owing to the lord of the fee. Although that clause of
the Provisions of Westminster was not reenacted in the Second Magna Carta
in 1267,10 gifts to religious houses were again seriously restricted by the
Statute de Viris Religiosis" in 1279.12

Corporations as well as religious organizations had unlimited life 3 and
occasioned similar problems. Consequently, legislation restricting religious
holdings was extended to include corporate holdings generally, 1 4 although
nearly all early corporations were religious in nature.1 5 In a broad sense,
though, the corporate entity generally tended to prevent the regular occurrence
of those events giving rise to the incidents of tenure and thus power.
In recognition of the land's importance to feudal society, the state

3. 2 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 348-49 (4th ed. 1936).
4. Horenstein, Corporate Control and Private Property Rules, 92 U. PA. L. REV. 1,
11 (1944).
5. The great frequency of land grants to the Church sprang from the conflict between
the beliefs and the type of life characteristic of the Normans in the period which followed
the Conquest. 1 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 27, at 63 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as R. POWELL].
6. Horenstein, supra note 4, at 12; 2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 281
(3d ed. 1832).
7. 1 R. POWELL, supra note 5, 27, at 63.
8. That concern was not unique to feudal England. It has been said to date back
to the Roman Empire in the third century. Frederick Barbarossa apparently restricted the
passage of land to churches in 1158. 2 HALLAM'S MIDDLE AGES 320 (8 vol. ed. 1818), cited in
L. SHELFORD, THE LAW OF MORTMAIN 24 (Wharton ed. 1842). That author also noted the
presence of such legislation in thirteenth century France. See, e.g., ORDONNANCES DES Rois,
213-303 (Louis IX).
9. 43 Hen. 3 (1267).
10. 3 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 87 (3d ed. 1923).
11. 7 Edw. 1, c. vii, §348 (1279). Gifts of lands to religious houses were prohibited without
the King's license.
12. "The King maturely considered the grievance complained of . . . and thus the
legislature was induced to interpose by the statute DE RELIGIOSIS ANNO. 1279." A. HIGHmORE, supra note 1.
13. Horenstein, supra note 4, at 12.
14. 15 Rich. 2 c. 5 (1390).
15. Horenstein, supra note 4, at 13.
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regulated holdings in mortmain. 1 The free alienability of land was critical
to the efficient functioning of the feudal triangle. Accordingly, the state
sought to prevent land from falling into hands from which transfers were
unlikely. The later Rule against Perpetuities, 7 for example, was designed
to preclude interests from being returned to transferors after excessive periods
of time.'5
The Church was not without power in feudal England, however, and
the evolving body of mortmain law reflects the balance between its influence
and that of the Crown. 9 The Church contended that any question of application of mortmain law involved an interest of God; therefore, the question
should be heard in the ecclesiastical courts. 20 The King, on the other hand,
maintained that since title to land was involved, the Crown court was the
proper forum. Henry VIII "graciously conceded that if God were interested
the Church courts should handle these cases, but subtly insisted that in each
controversy a jury [first must] be summoned in the King's court to decide
whether God had the requisite interest."21 When read together, the body of
English mortmain statutes through the twentieth century highlights periods
of relative strengths of the royal and ecclestiastical authorities, as well as
22
various related social shifts.
AMERiCAN LEGISLATION

English mortmain laws were generally rejected as part of the American
common law23 because of their inconsistency with domestic social philosophy24

16. 7 R. POwELL, supra note 5, 970, at 514.
17. The earliest formulation of the Rule against Perpetuities is found in the Duke of
Norfolk's Case, Ch. Cas. 1, 26 (1682).
18. Perhaps the best discussion of the Rule against Perpetuities is still found in I.C.
GRAY, THE RuLE AGAINSr PE TEIrums (4th ed. 1942). The analogy between the law of
mortmain and the Rule against Perpetuities is noted in Horenstein, supra note 4, at 16:
"The statutory 'Law of Mortmain' to keep too much land from getting into the hands of
an undying owner and remaining there was followed by measures to keep property (land
or money) from remaining too long subject to the control of a dead owner. While the
specific conditions inspiring what is known as the Rule against Perpetuities are not in
all instances paralleled by conditions in corporations, both situations involve the same
basic problem-that control may be continued beyond one lifetime."
19. 2 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 3, at 348.
20. F. POLLOCK 9- F.W. MAITLAND, II HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 332 (2d ed. 1899).
21. 1 R. PowtLL, supra note 5, 27, at 64, citing F. PoLLocK & F.W. MAITLAND, 11
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 829 (2d ed. 1899).
22. W. FINLASON, HISToRY AND EFFEars OF THE LAws OF MORTMAIN 22-40 (1808)
discusses at length the possibility of interpreting the pre-Reformation mortmain statutes
as dealing exclusively with the legal relations of landholders. These early statutes, Finlason
contends, address themselves not at all to the purpose of the alienation. His analysis
considers mortmain statutes as attempting to preserve the duties owed by landowners, not
as wresting temporal power from churchly and charitable units.
23. Joslin, "Mortmain" in Canada and the United States: A Comparative Study, 29
CAN. B. REv. 621, 622 (1951).
24. Id.
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or unsuitability to local circumstances. 25 Nevertheless, although the body of
law was not adopted, 26 its imprint has been seen in some legislation.
At least eleven jurisdictions, including Florida, place some restriction on
gifts to charities.2 7 These statutes provide that a testamentary transfer to a
charity will fail unless the testator survives the making of the will for a
specified time2 or that the transfer not exceed a specified share of his gross
3
estate. 29 Some statutes include both requirements. o
The historical basis for such American legislation is probably found in
the Georgian Mortmain statute, 3' which established somewhat rigid requirements for an effective inter vivos conveyance to mortmain. The transfer had
to be properly witnessed, executed at least twelve months before the grantor's
death, and recorded within six months of execution. American laws regulate
testamentary rather than inter vivos transfers, but similarly require compliance
with formalities to effectively transfer property to a charity.
American statutes differ considerably from their English counterparts,
reflecting a different social context and addressing different concerns. The
scope of American laws is broader. English statutes were restricted in application to real property because of the predominance of land as the unit of
wealth of the feudal hierarchy. 2 American laws operate indiscriminately on
both real and personal property33 and most govern all charitable gifts rather
than simply gifts to religious or corporate bodies. 4 They seem to express
concern for delivering property out of a traditional capitalistic context rather
35
than into a dead hand.
25.

Magill v. Brown, 1 Brightly's Rpts. 350, 374-76 (1851) [originally reported, I Parsons

108 (1833)].
26. 2 J. KENT, supra note 6, at 282. Pennsylvania alone received the English mortmain
law for a brief period. See Magill v. Brown, 1 Brightly's Rpts., at 374-76.
27. They are District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Mississippi, Montana,
New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and the Virgin Islands.
28. D.C. CODE ANN. §18-302 (1973); FLA. STAT. §732.803 (1975); OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. §210.86 (Page 1968); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §2507 (Purdon 1975); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§91-142 (1947).
29. IOWA CODE ANN. §633.266 (1964); N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS §35-3.3 (McKinney
1967); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 15, §9 (1964).
30. GA. CODE ANN. §113-107 (1935); IDAHO CODE §15-2-615 (Supp. 1971); Miss. CONST.
art. 14, §270 (1940).
31. 9 Geo. 2 c. 36 (1735-1736).
32. 7 Edw. 1 (1279); 18 Edw. 1, c. 3 (1290); 15 Rich. 2, c. 5 (1391); 23 Hen. 8, c.
10 (1531); 9 Geo. 2 c. 36 (1735); 51 & 52 Vict., c. 42, §1 (1888). All limit their operation
to real property.
33. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE §15-2-615(a) (Supp. 1971): "No estate, real or personal, shall
be bequeathed or devised to any charitable or benevolent society or corporation or to
any person or persons in trust for charitable uses, except the same be done by will duly
"
executed at least thirty (30) days before the decease of the testator ....
34. All the surveyed statutes apply to charitable gifts except that of the District of
Columbia. D.C. CODE ANN. §18-302 (1973). For a reprint of this statute, see note 43 infra.
35. "When the owner is in danger of losing his land on a contingency beyond his
control, the property is not as fully utilized by the owner of the present estate as it
would be if his title were indefeasible. A second objection in a democratic state is
political and was advanced by Bacon some 350 years ago: If all lands were tied up, 'land
should rest in certain families and others could be but their farmers,' [Bacon, Argument in
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In New York, the statute limiting the percentage of the total estate
that may be left to charitable organizations 8 is based on the desire to protect
heirs and close relatives of the testator. 37 Under New York law, one can
leave no more than half of one's estate to a charitable organization. 38 Yet, in
order for the statute to operate, a close relative must be available to object.
Therefore, a charitable beneficiary may take an entire estate if there are no
persons belonging to the requisite class or if no existing class members choose
to exercise their power. The statute clearly operates to protect close relatives
from being disinherited in favor of a charity.
Such concern for protecting close relatives is commonly mentioned as a
justification for these mortmain laws. Some mortmain laws fail in practice
to support that justification. For example, Montana limits charitable bequests
without regard to the existence of objectors.39 Although the enactment also
theoretically serves to protect those close to the testator, it tracks very close
to the true mortmain law. It would disallow a charitable bequest even if
the testator had no relatives. The estate might then escheat, contrary to the
testator's intent.40
Theoretically, American legislation is intended to restrict a testator's right
to dispose of some or all of his property, not to prevent charitable accumulations. 41 If every American for several generations left the maximum permissible
share of his estate to a charity, such organizations would eventually control an
astronomical share of domestic wealth. Additionally, since inter vivos transfers

Chudleigh's Case, (translated from the Law French and reprinted in Bacon's Works)
(Spedding ed. 1861), XV 172] a condition not conducive to good citizenship." Horenstein,
supranote 4, at 19 n.94.

86. N.Y. EsT., PowEas & TRUSTS §5-83 (McKinney 1967) provides in xelevant part: "A
person may make a testamentary disposition of his entire estate to any person for a
benevolent, charitable, educational, literary, scientific, religious or missionary purpose,
provided that if any such disposition is contested by the testator's surviving issue or
parents, it shall be valid only to the extent of one-half of such testator's estate, wherever
situated, after the payment of debts....'
87. In re Hills' Estate, 150 Misc. 518, 519, 269 N.Y.S. 558, 559 (1988), rev'd on other
grounds, 264 N.Y. 849, 191 N.E. 12 (1984).
88. See note 86 supra
89. MoNT. RPv. CoDEs ANN. §91-142 (1947): "No estate, real or personal shall be
bequeathed or devised to any charitable or benevolent society or corporation, or to any
person or persons in trust for charitable uses, except the same be done by will duly
executed at least thirty (80) days before the decease of the testator, and also made at
least thirty (80) days prior to such death, such devise or legacy, and each of them shall be
valid; provided that the prohibition contained in this section shall not apply to cases
where not more than one-third (1/8) of the estate of the testator shall be bequeathed
or devised for charitable or benevolent purposes, and provided further, that if any such
devise or bequest be made in a will, executed within thirty (30) days prior to such death
and be for more than one-third (1/8) of the estate of the decedent, the same shall be
void as to the excess over one-third, but as to that only."
40. See, e.g., In re Chapman's Estate, 89 D. & C. 2d 701, 16 Fiduciary 496 (1966). The
1970 redraft of 20 Pa. C.S. 180 (F)(1) [Acts. 1970, Apr. 22, P.L. 805. No. 98 §11, now
codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §2507 (1) (1975), provided that the state shall not
have power to object to a charitable bequest.
41. 1 W. PAGE, PAGE ON Thm LAW OF Wms ,§3.15, at 105 (3d ed. 1960).
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are not regulated, all property could come within the grasp of the dead hand,
inter vivos, and the so-called "mortmain" statutes would have no effect.
The purposes of American mortmain law clearly embrace considerations
beyond simply preventing accumulation of property into the dead hand. It
has been suggested that one such purpose is to protect the testator from the
possibility of deathbed pressure.4 2 Faced with imminent death, a person might
be persuaded to leave wealth to a charity to ease his conscience. The District
of Columbia statute operated directly on that possibility by limiting deathbed
bequests to religious organizations or representatives thereof. 43 Such a statute
could be characterized as creating a presumption of undue influence 44 by an
otherwise revered class. 45 Since evidence of such pressure may be shown in a
probate contest irrespective of the statute's existence, 4 the necessity of the
legislation is questionable. Further, by making the presumption conclusive,
evidence of extreme frustration of a testator's intent could not be received.
Protecting the testator's close relatives from disinheritance has also been
suggested as justification for the statutes.4 7 Since the statutes, however, restrict
only the quantity of the gift and the time within which it must be made,
the testator could still easily disinherit his relatives. The statute would only
prevent him from benefiting those organizations with charitable aims. The
general interest in providing for the less fortunate might be thought to
outweigh such a result.

48

Professor Powell has suggested that these statutes also serve to protect the
testator from making unsound bequests.
Crackpots exist in any society and at all economic levels. A giver,
sincerely convinced as to the social importance of a particular activity,
that his project would be both
may be so completely off-the-beam 49
absurdly foolish and grossly wasteful.
The veracity of that statement is reflected in day-to-day human events. Again,
42. T. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS §35, at 136 (2d ed. 1953).
43. D. C. CODE ANN. §18-302 (1973) provides: "A devise or bequest of real or personal
property to a minister, priest, rabbi, public teacher, or preacher of the gospel, as such,
or to a religious sect, order, or denomination, or to or for the support, use, as benefit
thereof, or in trust therefor, is not valid unless it is made at least thirty (30) days before
the death of the testator."
44. Note, Standing to Contest Wills Violating Charitable Bequest Statutes, 50 COLtre.

L. REV. 94, 97 (1950).
45. See In re Small, 100 WksH. D.C. L. REP. 453 (D.D.C. Feb. 7, 1972). See also discussion
at note 117 infra.
46. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE §22 (West 1956): "A will or part of a will procured to be
made by duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence, may be denied probate; and a revocation procured by the same means may be declared void."
47. In Nat'l Bank of Greece v. Savarikq, 167 Miss. 571, 596, 148 So. 649, 656 (1933) the
Court stated: "That provision . . . [is] a limitation . . . designed in extenso to prevent
one who would not be generous at his own expense from being generous at the expense
of his heirs." See also In re Estate of Graham, 63 Cal. App. 41, 48, 218 P. 84, 87 (1923) and

7 R. POWELL, supra note 5, 974, at 572-74.
48. Note, supra note 44, at 97.
49. 4A R. POWELL, supra note 5, %578, at 561.
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however, American mortmain legislation only protects "off-the-beam"
testators from a limited class of "crackpots" -charitable ones. The selfinterested alchemist or revolutionary would be unhindered in his or her
solicitations.
The protection of the state's interest might provide an additional justification for mortmain laws. Conceivably, disinherited persons might become a
burden of the public charge. A testator, by leaving all his wealth to a charity,
might increase the state's welfare obligation. The statutes meet that
end in only a limited way. They prevent disinheritance from occurring only
if a charity is the beneficiary. Again, the testator could act to increase the
state's welfare burden with innumberable testamentary schemes. Such a
justification is at best very remote. If the state has an interest in preventing
the exclusion of relatives from a will, it could more directly achieve that
result by enacting a forced-share provision for all close relatives similar to the
one commonly employed for the protection of a spouse.50
Finally, the American statutes are limited to testamentary transfers. 51
Whatever their justification or purpose, they can be easily avoided. A person
may still benefit a member of the proscribed class either quickly or to an
impermissible extent. He need only transfer the property inter vivos. Any
protections afforded himself or his relatives by the operation of mortmain
52
law would then be lost.
Although a court occasionally goes out of its way to give effect to mortmain statutes,53 the line of cases generally evidences a judicial preference for
avoiding them.54 For example, in New York, heirs were long held to waive
the statute's protection when there was no affirmative provision for such a
waiver. 5s Even more extreme are those cases that require an affirmative objection by a member of the protected class absent such a statutory requirement.5 6 In In re Plaster'sEstate,5 7 a court went so far as to imply a waiver by
the protected class when it neither was required nor actually occurred.

THE TRILOGY OF Small, Riley AND Cavil
Decisions limiting the operation of mortmain statutes perhaps represent
judicial recognition of the inherent shortcomings of the legislation. Despite
See, e.g., N.Y. Esr., PoWERs & TRUSTS §5-1.1 (McKinney 1967).
51. See, e.g., statutes at notes 28-80 supra.
52. Joslin, supra note 23, at 628. See also President of Bowdoin College v. Merritt, 75
F. 480 (N.D. Cal. 1896), appeal dismissed, 169 U.S. 551 (1896).
53. In re Blumenthal's Estate, 126 Misc. 603, 215 N.Y.S. 142 (1926); In re Opdyke's
Will, 230 App. Div. 290, 243 N.Y.S. 606, modified on other grounds, 255 N.Y. 255, 174 N.E. 646
50.

(1930).
54. In re Webster's Estate, 108 Misc. 342, 33 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1942).
55. Amherst College v. Ritch, 151 N.Y. 282, 43 N.E. 876 (1897). This case also noted
that the relevant New York statute was not in the nature of a mortmain statute because
it acted on the power of the testator to give, rather than on the power of corporations to
take and hold.
56. In re Rosenberg's Will, 174 Misc. 837, 299 N,Y.S, 462 (1937); In re Hills, 264 N.Y.
349, 101 N.E. 12 (1934).
57. 179 Misc. 80, 37 N.Y.S.2d 498 (1942),
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the long existence of the statutes, they have not been brought under direct
attack until recently. 58 Even commentators have generally failed to question
the fundamental propriety of such legislation.59 In 1972, however, the District
of Columbia mortmain statute 0 was struck down in the case, In re Small.61
The statute was unique among those previously discussed because it singled
out religions from charities62 and failed to delineate a class of suitable objectors.63
Decedent left her estate to various religious organizations and other
charities. She was survived by no close relatives or heirs at law. Mindful
of the statute, the executor of the estate petitioned the court for instructions
pending a distribution. Judge Gerhard Gesell speaking for the court, held
that the statute violated the First Amendment because it unduly interfered
with "religious practice." ,4 He characterized the statute as "in the nature of
a mortmain statute," and indicated that it was an "anachronism [from] the
early Nineteenth Century." 65 He suggested further that religious organizations
should, if anything, be in a preferred position vis h vis government regulation and that this regulation singled them out for harsher treatment. Concluding that no compelling state interest was present, Judge Gesell found that
the statute was not even necessary to effectuate any state interest because
it failed to meet the problem of bequests to other unspecified beneficiaries.66
In re Estate of Riley,67 which involved similar facts as Small, arose in
Pennsylvania shortly before Small. In November 1969, a widower in Blair
County, Pennsylvania, died leaving a will prepared some ten days earlier.
58. For example, in Rhymer's Appeal, 93 Pa. 148 (1880), the constitutionality of the
Pennsylvania statute went unquestioned.
59. See, e.g., T. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS §35, at 135-38 (2d ed.

1953).
60. D.C. CODE ANN. §18-302 (1973). See note 43 supra.
61. 100 WASH. D.C. L. REP. 453 (D.D.C. Feb. 7, 1972). The case is also reported in
40 U.S.L.W. 2547 (Feb. 22, 1972).
62. See note 43 supra.
63. Id.
64. In re Small, 100 Wash. D.C. L. Rep. 453 (D.D.C. Feb. 7, 1972).
65. "The Statute . .. [is] an anachronism peculiar to the District of Columbia which
dates back to the early nineteenth century, at the time when the law with respect to the
transfer of realty to Church institutions was quite different and in the nature of a Mortmain statute." Id. at 457.
The uniqueness of D.C. CODE ANN. §18-302 (1973), is, of course, conceded in that its
operation is limited only to religious beneficiaries. The characterization of the statute
as one "with respect to the transfer of realty" would as well serve to bring it somewhat
closer to a mortmain statute. (That limitation though is not borne out either in the
text of the statute as it was before the court, see note 42, or in the text of the original
statute. R.S.D.C. §457 [Act of July 25, 1866].)
The statute, however, differs markedly from the traditional mortmain statutes. It is
aimed at gifts in wills and not at accumulations by religious houses.
66. "Clearly the statute discriminates against religion. Many others would be in a
similar position to influence the testator. . . . The statute does not run to any such
persons and, therefore, it cannot be said to be a statute which is designed to prohibit
all bequests suggesting improper influence because made in the 30 days prior to execution
of a will." In re Small, 100 WASH. D.C. L. REP. 453, 457 (D.D.C. Feb. 7, 1972).
67. In re Estate of Riley,
Pa.
, 329 A.2d 511 (1974).
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After several specific bequests, he left the "rest, residue and remainder of my
estate of whatsoever nature and character... unto the Pastor of St. Michael's
Catholic Church of Hollidaysburg, Pennsylvania, to be used in whatever
way it deems fit and proper and for the benefit of both St. Michael's Church
and School." 6s1 The Pennsylvania statute provided that for bequests to
charities to be effective they had to be executed at least 30 days prior to the
testator's death.6 9 Heirs of the testator filed objections to the executor's
proposed distribution to the church. After hearing oral argument, the court
concluded that the residuary clause was void under the statute. Shortly
thereafter, the attorney representing the residuary beneficiary petitioned for
reconsideration and leave to present new arguments. He argued that after
the decision of the court, he learned of the Small case, which gave rise to a
"new [constitutional] argument not earlier available."70 The court granted
the petition, noting that although Small came down prior to its decision,
"knowledge of this decision was not had by this court or by any counsel here
involved until subsequent to the filing of the Order and Decree." 71 It is
unclear why the constitutional arguments relating to the statute were unavailable prior to Small. Furthermore, Small related to a much narrower
statute that was directed solely at religions. At any rate, the judge granted a
rehearing and heard the constitutional argument.
The court felt that the Pennsylvania statute unreasonably infringed on a
person's right to practice his religion.72 It proceeded to note that the
Pennsylvania statute, directed not only at religions but at all charities, was
even more reprehensible than the statute struck down in Small. By prohibiting
all charitable gifts within the period, it operated against, rather than in
furtherance of the "health, safety and general welfare by virtue of the fact
that as a matter of fact most charitable gifts found in a will is [sic] for bequests
to charitable organizations promoting the health, safety and general well
being of the people." 73 The trend to legislatively weaken the statute was
next noted. The court concluded:
[I]t is apparent that in due time legislatively the restriction would be
entirely removed from the enactment . . .the same should be done
forthwith because it is an unconstitutional provision contrary to the
First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America,
74
and for that reason we strike the provision as being unconstitutional.

68. In re Estate of Riley, Decree #220 of the Orphan's Court, Division of the Blair
County, Pa. Court of Common Pleas (1972).
69. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §2307 (1972), provides, in relevant part: "Any bequest or
decree for religious or charitable purpose included in a will or codicil executed within
thirty days of the death of the testator shall be invalid unless all who would benefit
by its invalidity agree that it shall be valid."
70. In re Estate of Riley, Decree #432 of the Orphan's Court, Division of the Blair

County Pa. Court of Common Pleas (on petition for reconsideration) (1972).
71. Id. at 49a.
72. Id. at 62a.
73. Id.

74. Id. at 62a, 63a.
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A part of the statute might properly have been stricken as unduly interfering with a person's right to act in accordance with his religious beliefs.
To place the unconstitutionality of the statute as a whole on the same ground,
however, is to paint with too broad a brush. The judge seems to suggest
that a state statute that does not serve the health, safety, or morals of society
exceeds the police powers of the state.7 5 Such a view might be appropriate in
examining an act of Congress that transgresses those powers specifically
enumerated in the Constitution. A state legislature, acting under the authority
of the tenth amendment of the United States Constitution has much broader
powers of legislation. 6 The United States Supreme Court has long affirmed
the power of states to freely regulate succession. 77 That legislative power is
only limited when it tends to infringe on protected individual rights.7
Since past legislative action indicated a loosening of the statutory requirement for valid gifts to charities,' 9 the judge concluded that the mortmain restrictions would eventually be eliminated entirely by legislative
actions. 80 The legislative motivation for the changes, however, was not
discussed by the Riley court. The legislature's modifications could well have
indicated an intention to restrict certain kinds of bequests - and to do it
as narrowly and properly as possible. Had the legislature wished to abolish
the proscription entirely, it might easily have done so. Thus, the conclusion
of the Riley court is not inescapable.
An appeal in Riley was filed in the January 1973 Term of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court. The court did not decide the case until late in 1974.81 By that
time, the court had before it another case that proved to be the downfall
of the Pennsylvania Mortmain Statute. 82
In In re Estate of Cavill,8 3 a will was executed short of the requisite
statutory period governing charitable bequests. 84 The decedent left as heirs
only children of her deceased brothers and sister.85 The residuary clause
benefited various nonreligious charitable organizations. The final accounting
M

75. Id. at 61a.
76. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 62-66 (1873).
77. "[A] long line of cases . . . have consistently held that part of the residue of
sovereignty retained by the states, a residue insured by the Tenth Amendment is the
power to determine the testamentary transfer of a domiciliary's property and the power
to determine who may be made beneficiaries." United States v. Burnstein, 339 U.S. 87, 91-92
(1950). See also, United States v. Fox, 94 U.S. 315 (1877).
78. First amendment religious protections were made obligatory to the States via the
fourteenth amendment in Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972).
79. See, Act of April 26, 1855, P.L. 328, §11; Act of June 7, 1917, P.L. 402, §6; Act of
May 16, 1939, P.L. 141; Act of April 24, 1947, P.L. 89, §7(1); 20 PA. STAT. ANN. §2507(1) (Supp.
1974).
80. In re Estate of Riley, Decree #432 of the Orphan's Court, Division of the Blair
County, Pa. Court of Common Pleas at 62(a) (1972).
81. In re Estate of Riley,
Pa.
,329 A.2d 511 (1974).
82. In re Estate of Cavill,
Pa.
,329 A.2d 503 (1974).
83. Id.
84. The will was executed on October 31, 1957, and the decedent died on November
23, 1957. Id. at
,329 A. 2d at 504.
85. Id. at
n.
, 329 A.2d at 506 n.9.
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indicated operation of the Pennsylvania mortmain statute. The judge of the
Orphan's Court of Erie County held the statute unconstitutional and ordered
distribution of the residue of the estate.8 6 The heirs appealed that decision
to the Pennsylvania supreme court. Although the lower court based its decision on the due process, privileges and immunities, and equal protection
clauses of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution,"
the supreme court limited its decision to equal protection grounds.88
The court noted that the statute created a classification and that, under
the test set forth in Eisenstadt v. Baird,8 9 such a classification must bear a
"fair and substantial relation" to its legislative purpose. Perhaps surprisingly,
the classification on which the court focused was that of testators - the statute
treated differently those persons who died leaving property to charities within
thirty days of making out their wills. The court looked to Bogert9- and earlier
Pennsylvania cases9 ' to determine that the purpose of the statutes was to
protect the testator's family from unwise gifts and to relieve the testator of
deathbed pressures. Concluding that "the statutory classification bears
only the most tenuous relation to the legislative purposes," 92 the court
held the statute unconstitutional.93 Although Cavill involved a superseded
statute, 94 the court extended its holding by noting that since the sections in
both the old and new statute were "identical in effect," the court's analysis
of the superceded statute was "equally applicable" to the new statute. 95 The
dissent, however, criticized this extension of the court's holding. "Because
the language of the two provisions is not identical ... there would appear no
necessity for adjudicating the constitutionality of the latter provision until
the issue is squarely before this Court." 98 The two-judge dissent further revealed that the new statutory section operates to reverse the presumption of
97
invalidity and bars the state from taking by escheat.
98
The court then considered the Riley case. It affirmed the lower court's
decision that the statute was unconstitutional but declined to discuss the
merits of the trial court's view that the statute was violative of the first
86.
87.
88.
89.

Cavil[ Estate, 56 E~iU

COUNTY LEGAL

U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
In re Estate of Cavill,
Pa. at
405 U.S. 438 (1972).

,

J. 44 (Pa. O.C. 1973).
329 A.2d at 505.

3 G. BoGERT, THE LAW OF TRusTs AND TRUsm s §326 at 683 (2d ed. 1964).
91. In re McGuigen Estate, 388 Pa. 475, 478, 131 A.2d 124, 126 (1957); In re Paxson's
Estate, 221 Pa. 98, 111, 70 A. 280, 285 (1908).
92. In re Estate of Cavill,
Pa. at
, 329 A.2d at 505.
93. The appellants in the companion case, Riley, filed a petition for a writ of certiorari
to the United States Supreme Court. On May 11, 1975, the Court denied that petition.
In Re Estate of Riley,
Pa.
, 329 A.2d 511, cert. denied, 421 U.S. 971 (1975). That
disposition was not surprising. Riley was decided on the basis of the Cavill case. In Cavill,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rested their decision not only on the United States
Constitution, but on the Pennsylvania constitution as well.
94. In re Estate of Cavill,
Pa. at
n.
,329 A.2d at 504 n.1.
90.

95.

96.
97.
tit. 20,
98.

Id.

Id. at

n.

Compare PA.

,329 A.2d at 506 n.l.
ANN. tit. 20, §2507(1) (1975) with its predecessor PA.

STAT.

§ 180.7 (1964).
In re Estate of Riley,

Pa. at

,329

STAT.

ANN.

A.2d at 511.
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amendment. It noted that irrespective of the reasons stated in Riley, since the
action was correct, the opinion must be affirmed. 99
The vigorous dissent in Cavill attacked the equal protection basis of the
majority opinion. Although not conceding that a classification was in fact involved, Judge Pomeroy suggested that the proper test for the constitutional
validity of an economic or social classification is that of rational basis. He
then said that the majority only paid lip service to that test and in fact
applied the compelling state interest test to invalidate the statute because
of its mere lack of "mathematical precision."' 00
MORTMAIN STATUTES AND RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION

The religious discrimination arguments raised in Riley and Small are
equally applicable to other state statutes that operate to exclude religious
takers within the broader class of charities. The first amendment to the
United States Constitution contains a two-pronged protection of religion. It
prohibits legislation respecting an establishment of religion and protects
against state infringement on the free exercise of religion.' 0
The free exercise clause embraces two concepts - the freedom to act and

the freedom to believe. 1 2 The Supreme Court has held that the freedom to
believe is absolute, but that the freedom to act is not.103 Since religious
freedom is a fundamental right,10 4 a statute restricting religious practice is
subject to strict scrutiny 1°5 and may only be justified by a compelling state
interest. 0 6
Free exercise challenges to mortmain statutes might be mounted on the

basis of the statutes' interference with either donors or donees. Alms-giving
is a well-established tenet of
right of a testator to leave
religion 10 8 or by mandating
becomes effective, the statutes

the Judeo-Christian theology. 0 7 By limiting the
more than a certain share of his money to a
the passage of time before which such a gift
operate to limit his freedom to act in furtherance

n. ,329 A.2d 511 at 531 n.l.
99. Id. at
, 329 A.2d at 506-09. Labine v. Vincent, 401
Pa. at
100. In re Estate of Cavil[,
U.S. 532 (1971), was persuasively cited. In that case the United States Supreme Court upheld
the validity of a Louisiana statute denying to illegitimate children the same treatment as
legitimate ones on the death of the father. The Court rejected an equal protection challenge
because the state's broad powers over inheritance and the state's rational basis for
promoting family life and directing the distribution of property left within the State. 401
U.S. at 538-39.
101. Charitable giving is considered a biblical injunctionm The biblical Hebrew word
meaning "charity" translates also as "righteousness," the achievement of which is a major
goal of every person. See 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA, charity, 338-54 (1971). See also, B. BoCN,
JEWISH PHILANTHROPY (1917).

102. U.S. CONsr. amend. I.
103. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
104.

105.
106.
107.
108.
perhaps

W. Va. State Board of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).

Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
Id.
See note 101 supra.
Since alms-giving to nonreligious charities might satisfy one's religious beliefs,
the statutes as they relate to any charity are also open to attack.
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of his religious beliefs. A compelling state interest sufficient to justify such
an intrusion would be difficult to fashion. Commonly delineated state interests
include the protection of the testator from undue deathbed influence, the
relatives from being improvidently disinherited, and the state from the
acquisition of new walfare charges. These state interests are met so haphazardly
and with such imprecision by the mortmain acts that it is unlikely that the
statutes' force could be said to override individual religious pursuits.
The Supreme Court has upheld statutes that interfere with the freedom
to act in a furtherance of one's religious beliefs. Such regulation must have a
demonstrably independent secular basis that could not be effectuated absent
that particular regulation. 109 Thus, for example, when state child labor laws
were in conflict with children's religious activities, the state restrictions were
allowed to stand.o Similarly, where the social interest in maintaining a
tranquil community day of rest was involved, a Sunday closing ordinance
was upheld in spite of the existence of different sabbaths among various religions.

11

In both cases, the state's interest was deemed of sufficient independent

secular importance to justify an incidental intrusion into the area of religious
action. Although the current mortmain statutes further an undeniably secular
state interest, their intrusion into religious action is significant, and their
ends could well be reached in other ways.
The mortmain statutes also restrict the ability of beneficiaries to act
in furtherance of their religious beliefs. The Supreme Court has held that
the protection of the free exercise clause attaches not only to individuals but
also to religious institutions."' If the ability of religious organizations to
amass funds is restricted, their pursuit of religious activities will be hampered.-3
It is unlikely that the state can meet the sizeable burden of showing a
compelling state interest here."14
OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS _AFT

THE TRILOGY

Beyond the arguments successfully raised - violations of the testator's
rights to equal protection and his right to act in furtherance of his religious
beliefs- several viable constitutional arguments remain. It can be suggested
that the proscribed beneficiaries are denied equal protection as well. As to the
religious beneficiaries who are prevented from taking, the suspect classification of religious association might be said to be involved. The test of strict
scrutiny" 5 would properly be applied, as to that group, and the state would
bear the bruden of showing a compelling state interest. Meeting that burden

would be difficult. With respect to the class of nonreligious charities that
109. Abingdon School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
110. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 _(1944).
111. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 US. 599 (1961).
112. See, e.g., Walz v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
113. Certain functions carried on by religious institutions, such as education and even
worship, are expensive and must be funded to continue.
114. In Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607, the Supreme Court indicated that
even where a burden on religious practice is indirect it should not stand if "the State
may accomplish its purpose by means which do not impose such a burden."
115. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304-U.S. 144 (1938).
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are singled out, even if the rational basis test was utilized, the statute would
fail if that test was applied in similar fashion to the test in Cavill.116
Additionally, the operation of mortmain statutes might present the due
process problems. The statutes by barring charities from taking, create a
conclusive presumption of undue influence on the part of the groups standing
to benefit under wills that fail to qualify under the statute." 7 If the testator
either does not survive the making of his will by the requisite period or
leaves too much of his estate to charities, the court can receive no evidence
of his intent, of the circumstances surrounding his death, or of the making
of his will. The dissent in Cavill noted that the effect of the rule may be
mitigated under the Pennsylvania statute by obtaining the consent of the
relatives or by showing that the will is a republication of a prior one. Although one or both of those methods might ameliorate a bad result, they
are not sufficiently broad arid are directed only tangentially at the presumption.
The expectancy interest possessed by potential takers under a will has
been held not to be of sufficient moment to be characterized as "property"
within the meaning of the due process clause." 8 Until such an interest is
held to merit fourteenth amendment protection, prospective recipients of
testamentary gifts that fail under mortmain statutes will lack standing to
challenge the constitutionality of the statutes.
In recent years, one major state has repealed its mortmain statute.1 9 Two
other jurisdictions have had their statute declared unconstitutional. The unfortunate union between historical mortmain law and a legislative interest in
protecting testators and their close relatives has given the dead hand continuing life. The trilogy of Small, Cavill, and Riley may be the harbinger
of its last grasp.
116. In re Estate of Cavill, Pa. at
, 329 A.2d at 506-09 (dissenting opinion).
117. LA. CODE CIV. PRO. ANN. art. 1489 (West 1952) voids gifts to "Doctors and
ministers who have professionally attended a person during the sickness of which that
person dies . . . if the gift is made during that sickness."
118. "Expectations or hopes of succession, whether testate or intestate, to the property
of a living person, do not vest until the death of that person." Irving Trust Co. v. Day,

314 U.S. 556, 562 (1941).
119.

CAL. PROB. CODE §§40-43

(West

1956), repealed Stats. 1971,

c. 1395, p. 2747,

§1 (1971).
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